AN INFORMATIONAL APPROACH TO THE MASS IMPRISONMENT PROBLEM

Adam M. Gershowitzt
The If prosecutors convict as many people as the law (and their budget) permits, they may well convict more defendants than the prison budget can handle. Because it would be politically unpopular to release such criminals due to overcrowding, legislatures are then forced to make supplemental appropriations for prisons, thus permitting incarceration rates to climb.
13
The purpose of this article is not to criticize the existence of prosecutorial discretion or to question the ethics of the lawyers exercising that discretion.
14 Instead, I explore a less recognized problem with prosecutorial discretion, namely that we ask prosecutors to use their discretion without reference to the resources held by the other parts of the criminal justice system. This article explores the possibility of making prosecutors more cognizant about the funding of the rest of the criminal justice system, and whether access to such information would affect prosecutors' charging/ 5 plea-bargaining, and dismissal decisions. 16 In short, this article proposes that legislatures require that prosecutors be regularly advised about prison capacity and conditions. Prosecutors should be informed about the total number of inmates incarcerated, the percentage of prison capacity filled, the increase in prison population over the last few years, and whether any prisons in the jurisdiction are under court supervision because of overcrowding or confinement conditions. Social psychology research suggests that simply being advised of the problem of prison overcrowding 13 June 19, 2006 , at A4 ("'It's going to eat up our entire budget,' [a budget committee member] said when the Joint Budget Committee was told in January that it had to come up with half a billion dollars to house 7,000 more prisoners in the next five years.").
14. There is, of course, a rich body of scholarship questioning these very issues. On the sub-surface problem of prosecutorial discretion, see William J. Stuntz, Bordenkircher v. Hayes: Plea Bargaining and the Decline of the Rule of Law, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE STORIES 351, 3 77 (Carol S. Steiker ed., 2006) (explaining that giving prosecutors wide discretion to invoke lengthy punishments makes it "cheaper" for legislatures to enact such punishments and to use legislation to make symbolic statements). (1995). 16. As Daniel Richman and Bill Stuntz have pointed out, a "small but important part of state criminal codes are politically mandatory. Local prosecutors do not have the option of ignoring violent felonies and major thefts." See Richman & Stuntz, supra note 5, at 600. However, while it would be inconceivable for prosecutors to dismiss these cases outright, they could offer less punitive plea bargains. may serve to influence prosecutors' charging, dismissal, and pleabargaining decisions. 17 And while advising prosecutors of such information will not undo the mass imprisonment in the United States, it may serve, at least on a small scale, to begin de-escalation.
18
Part I of this article briefly reviews the problem of mass imprisonment. Part II then explains how the United States Supreme Court's refusal to limit legislatures' power to criminalize behavior or impose excessive punishments prevents the judiciary from reducing mass imprisonment. Because the judiciary will not intervene, Part III considers whether legislatures might attempt to de-escalate mass imprisonment by mandating a simple informational campaign directed at prosecutors. Part III relies on social psychology literature to demonstrate that the simple act of advising prosecutors about funding problems might reduce the severity of prosecutors' plea bargain offers. Finally, Part IV asserts that the proposal is realistic. This proposal would not hinder legislators' efforts to be tough on crime because it would not alter their power to criminalize behavior or to impose stiff sanctions. In addition, the prospect of saving millions of dollars in annual criminal justice expenses provides a strong incentive for legislatures to consider the proposal. 17. See discussion infra Part III. 18. Because America's prison industrial complex is entrenched, it is implausible to suggest it can be drastically altered. As Professor Marie Gottschalk has recently explained, "[n]o single factor" can bring about the demise of America's extreme incarceration problem. Gottschalk, supra note 3, at 1705; see also Kevin budgeting to federal, and noting that states are required to balance their budgets between schools and prisons while Congress does not have such constraints); Brown, supra note 2, at 233, 252; Gottschalk, supra note 3, at 1698 ("As the fastest growing item in most state budgets, corrections became a target for budget cutters."); Daniel Richman, Institutional Coordination and Sentencing Reform, 84 TEX. L. REV. 2055, 2056, 2065 (2006) (explaining that the literature "tends to treat prosecutorial interests as monolithic" but that "state officials who have to actually pay for prisons" may be less prone to policies that increase incarceration). ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL [Ariz. St. L.J.
I. THE PERVASIVE PROBLEM OF MASS lMPRISONMENT 20
A.
Imprisonment by the Numbers
At present, there are nearly 2.2 million people incarcerated in our nation's prisons and jails.
21 Excluding children and the elderly, nearly one in fifty people in the United States wakes up behind bars each moming. 22 The United States incarcerates more offenders per capita than any industrialized nation in the world:
23 three times more than Israel, five times more than England, six times more than Australia and Canada, eight times more than France, and over twelve times more than Japan. 24 Given these ratios, it is not surprising that American prisoners convicted of violent crimes are incarcerated for five to ten times as long as their European counterparts. 25 And while European nations rarely incarcerate nonviolent property and drug offenders, more than half of the people imprisoned in the United States have committed nonviolent crimes.
26
More telling than the total number of prisoners or the international comparisons is the upward historical trend in the United States. As Michael Jacobson has observed, "every state increased the size of its prison system over the last decade." 27 30 Over the next three decades, the number of inmates and the rate per 100,000 Americans steadily climbed. In 1985, 313 per 100,000 people were incarcerated.
31 By 1995, the rate had risen to 601 per 100,000 people. 32 In its most recent estimate at mid-year 2005, the Bureau of Justice Statistics placed the rate at 738 prison and jail inmates per 100,000 people.
33
The drastic increase in imprisonment has had significant financial consequences. As a result of the increase in the prison population, the United States was required to open the equivalent of one prison per week during the period from 1985 to 2000. 34 The cost of locking up an offender for a single year exceeds $22,000. 35 In some states, the cost is double that amount. 36 All told, the United States spends approximately $60 billion annually on corrections.
37
And it is often questionable whether counties, states, and the federal government are spending enough money to keep up with the crushing number of incarcerated individuals. Many prisons and jails throughout the country are overcrowded. A recent study by the Bureau of Justice Statistics found that federal prisons held nearly 111,000 prisoners even though the facilities were only rated to handle approximately 83,000 individuals. 38 On average, state prison facilities were also operating in excess of their 28 . See MAUER, supra note 3, at I. The dramatic increase in incarceration beginning in the 1970s stands in stark contrast to the early decades of the Twentieth Century. As Marc Mauer has explained, there was "remarkable stability in incarceration, hovering around 200,000 inmates" during the "forty-five year period leading up to the 1970s. 45. See ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 7, at 124 (explaining that while variations in crime are not unrelated to prison populations, there is a "lack of a direct and simple relationship that would enable us to successfully explain most fluctuations in the rate of imprisonment by reference to changes in crime rates"). More recently, see MICHAEL TONRY, THINKING ABOUT CRIME 98 (2004) ("The best available evidence shows that gross crime trends are determined by fundamental social and structural forces that affect most Western countries, and that they follow much the same broad patterns irrespective of national differences in crime control policies and punishment practices. drastic increase in imprisonment has not led to a substantial decrease in crime rates.
46 Instead, observers explain the incarceration expansion by pointing to certain criminal justice policies. 47 The standard argument is that mandatory minimum statutes, three strikes laws, and the rise of determinate sentencing have resulted in a dramatic increase in the prison population.
48
Other observers point to the reduction in the use of probation and parole. 49 Still others raise concern about a variation of Parkinson's Law, 50 The most important influence on the rapid expansion of prisons in the United States during the last two decades appears to be informal changes in the system of criminal justice, which grow out of a new attitude toward punishment. The amount of discretion exercised by street-level bureaucrats in the criminal justice system is a major, driving force in the increase in rates of imprisonment. In addition to the power held by prosecutors, Professor Davey also points to judges' sentencing discretion, probation officers' authority in writing presentence reports, and parole officers' influence in determining whether to return individuals to prison. 59 While all of these actors-particularly prosecutors-have enormous discretion, Professor Davey maintains that the exercise of that discretion is strongly affected by whether or not the state's governor has created a "law and order" atmosphere.
60 Put simply, trial-level actors have wide discretion, but that discretion can be influenced to encourage more or less punitiveness.
If Professor Davey is correct, then there is a prospect of de-escalating the mass imprisonment problem by signaling to trial-level actors that they should be more cautious about relying on incarceration. As discussed below in Part II, the Supreme Court certainly has not given such a signal. To the contrary, the Court has taken a hands off approach.
II.
THE SUPREME COURT'S FAILURE TO STEP IN
A. The Power to Criminalize Almost Anything
Although the Supreme Court heavily regulates the criminal justice system, its regulation focuses almost exclusively on criminal procedure, rather than the substance of criminal law. 61 Accordingly, legislatures are free to enact virtually any laws they wish without interference from the courts. 60. See DAVEY, supra note 9, at 95 ("It is my argument here that in the states where the executive created an atmosphere of law and order, prison populations explode, whereas in the states where the atmosphere was less intemperate, the populations grew slowly.").
61. See Stuntz, supra note II ("Constitutionally speaking, substantive criminal law is almost entirely unregulated."); see also Luna, supra note 2, at 724 ("The one government body that could check political excesses and curb the overcriminalization phenomenon, the American judiciary, has largely failed to do so. 
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In the late 1950s and early 1960s it looked as if the Supreme Court might be willing to engage in some regulation of substantive criminal law. In Lambert v. California, decided in 1957, the Court struck down a law making it a crime for a convicted felon to remain in Los Angeles for more than five days without registering with the police. 62 The Court recognized that legislators have "wide latitude" to defme criminal infractions, but explained that since Lambert had no knowledge of her duty to register and had been "wholly passive," it would violate due process to convict her of the offense. 63 In dissent, Justice Frankfurter predicted that the Court's decision would tum out to be "an isolated deviation from the strong current of precedents-a derelict on the waters ofthe law."
64
Although Justice Frankfurter's prediction turned out to be correct, the Court did take one additional detour into the world of substantive criminal law a few years later. In Robinson v. California, the Supreme Court struck down a law making it a crime for a person to "be addicted to the use of narcotics." 65 The Court concluded that it would be cruel and unusual punishment to convict someone for a "status" rather than a particular act.
66
The Robinson decision seemed to signal that there would be constitutional scrutiny of criminal blameworthiness and more rigorous oversight of strict liability crimes.
67 Yet, that rigorous oversight did not come to pass. Only a few years later, in Powell v. Texas, the Court refused to find unconstitutional a statute making it a crime to be "found in a state of intoxication in any public place."
68 And since Powell, it is nearly impossible to find a non-capital case 69 71 In effect, the Supreme Court has completely abdicated the field of substantive criminal law.
72 The reason for the abdication is less clear, though Professor Erik Luna may well be correct that the Court simply does not want to appear to be a "Lochner-esque super-legislature."
73 And although scholars throughout the decades have been highly critical of the Court's failure to regulate the substance of criminal law 74 and have proposed a number of ways to impose such limits/ 5 all evidence indicates that the Court will continue to ignore these suggestions.
B. The Power to Impose Almost Any Punishment
Just as the Court has refused to limit legislatures' power to criminalize behavior, it also has been extremely wary of meddling with the punishment decisions of legislatures and juries. As explained below, the Court has made clear that, with the exception of death-penalty cases, legislatures can punish defendants as harshly as they want without fear that courts will strike down the sentences as unconstitutionally excessive.
For over a century, the Supreme Court has wrestled with the question of whether the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against "cruel and unusual punishment" permits courts to strike down prison sentences simply because they are too long. In 1892, Justice Stephen Field contended that a fifty-four year sentence for selling liquor without authority violated the Eighth Amendment.
76 Although Justice Field's position did not carry the day, a majority of the Court did subsequently find a sentence of fifteen years automobiles are so heavily regulated that total compliance would be impossible and that a heightened standard should be imposed for traffic stops). imprisonment at hard labor to be unconstitutionally excessive for the relatively minor offense of falsifying an official public document.
77
Several decades later, the Court struggled with the proportionality of long prison sentences for a series of very minor offenses. In 1980, the Court held that a sentence of life imprisonment for a recidivist who had conunitted three nonviolent property felonies involving less than $230 was constitutional because the "length of the sentence actually imposed is purely a matter of legislative prerogative."
78 Yet, three years later, the Court seemingly reversed its position again by holding a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for a recidivist who had conunitted seven nonviolent offenses to be excessive.
79
The Court's indecisiveness on the proportionality issue came to an end in the early 1990s. In Harmelin v. Michigan, the Court upheld a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for the crime of possession of more than 650 grams of cocaine. 80 While recognizing the existence of a "narrow proportionality principle," Justice Kennedy's plurality opinion made clear that successful challenges to long prison sentences would be extremely rare.
81 And since Harmelin it is nearly impossible to find any federal court willing to strike down a prison sentence as disproportionateY As recently as 2003, the Supreme Court has reiterated its opposition to proportionality review when it upheld California's "Three Strikes and You're Out" recidivism statute. 83 In short, federal proportionality review of criminal punishments is all but dead. And while certain state courts have engaged in more rigorous proportionality review by looking to their own state constitutions, 84 successful excessiveness challenges are still rare. As a result, when legislatures enact lengthy sentencing ranges, mandatory minimum statutes, three-strikes-and-you're-out-laws, and other tough-on-crime measures, trial judges are obligated to impose those stiff sentences irrespective of the circumstances. Because there is no judicial counterbalance to increasingly punitive laws, prosecutorial discretion becomes the main outlet for relief. And when political campaigns force each candidate or legislator to be tougher on crime than his opponent, the sentencing ranges and mandatory minimums become even longer. The result is more mass imprisonment.
C. Limited Oversight of Prison Condition Cases
Because so many defendants are sentenced to incarceration, prison officials are forced to scramble to find enough space to house them. 85 Often there are simply not enough beds and prisons are forced to operate above capacity. 86 This in tum leads to prison overcrowding, which in tum leads to litigation. 87 The litigation manifests itself in a variety of ways. Prisoners challenge the plain existence of the overcrowding. 88 They also contend that the overcrowding has led to other problematic conditions of confinement, such as unsanitary facilities, inadequate staffing, poor medical care, heightened levels of tension and violence, and a higher incidence of sexual assault. 
ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL
Unlike the areas of substantive criminal law and excessive punishments, the Supreme Court has not taken an entirely hands-off approach to the problem of prison conditions. 90 Beginning primarily in the 1960s, the lower federal courts began to conclude that certain prison conditions were so egregious as to violate the Eighth Amendment's cruel and unusual punishment clause. 91 While the lower federal courts were ahead of the Supreme Court in attacking egregious conditions, the high Court eventually followed suit. 92 In the notable case of Hutto v. Finney, the Supreme Court found unconstitutional prison conditions in which as many as ten inmates were confined to unfurnished, "vandalized," eight-by-ten-foot cells for "months" while being given inadequate food and being punished with leather straps and electrical shocks. 93 Thus, in the 1970s and early 1980s, the federal courts, with the support of the Supreme Court, were actively supervising prison overcrowding through injunctions and court decrees. 94 Interestingly, some wardens and corrections officials welcomed the litigation because federal court 90. Prior to the 1960s, the Court was extremely reluctant to provide any relief for claims of poor prison conditions. See Kenneth intervention slowed the flow of inmates into their facilities and mandated better, safer prisons.
95
The judiciary's involvement resulted in enormous improvements to prisons. 96 As Professor Margo Schlanger has recently observed:
Among the areas affected were staffing, the amount of space per inmate, medical and mental health care, food, hygiene, sanitation, disciplinary procedures, conditions in disciplinary segregation, exercise, fire safety, inmate classification, grievance policies, race discrimination, sex discrimination, religious discrimination and accommodations, and disability discrimination and accommodations-in short, nearly all aspects of prison and jail life, with the notable (if not quite universal) exceptions of education, custody level, and rehabilitative programming and employment.
97
Yet, while the federal judiciary has fostered enormous improvements in prison and jail conditions through structural reform litigation, the conventional wisdom is that the period of rigorous judicial reform of prisons is over or, at minimum, substantially decreased. 98 And with the judiciary's most rigorous period of reform behind it, it is noteworthy that the Supreme Court passed up the opportunity to attack the core problem of overcrowding. In Rhodes v. Chapman, the Court rejected a challenge to "double-ceiling" of prisoners because it did not lead to "deprivations of essential food, medical care, or sanitation. Nor did it increase violence 
In sum, the judiciary will not provide relief for our nation's mass imprisonment problem. Accordingly, I now turn to the question of whether legislatures and government bureaucracy can provide relief.
104
III.
AN INFORMATIONAL APPROACH TO REDUCING INCARCERATION
A. Reducing Incarceration at the Margins Through Information Flow
Because significant power in the criminal justice system is held by prosecutors who have the authority to charge, plea bargain, and dismiss He argues that such a proposal could lead to improvement while still being plausible because it does not require "substantial legislative action or dramatic shifts in constitutional doctrine." Id. at 371. My proposal is far less ambitious than Professor Brown's-it does not propose a new statute or any noticeable action by legislators-and is therefore more likely to avoid any type of"soft-on-crime" label.
cases, 105 it makes sense to focus on prosecutors as a mechanism for reducing mass imprisonment.
106 Yet, as explained above, the Supreme Court has little interest in restricting prosecutorial discretion, and state legislators standing for reelection are unlikely to pass legislation that explicitly reduces prosecutors' authority to handle serious criminal activity. Accordingly, I offer a more modest proposal that relies on government bureaucracy and social psychology to influence prosecutors' charging and plea bargaining decisions.
My proposal calls on state bureaucracies, in particular the states' bureaus of prisons, to undertake an informational campaign to advise county prosecutors about state incarceration rates and prison overcrowding. 107 The information should convey key information that is likely to influence prosecutors' charging and plea bargaining decisions, such as: ( 1) the total number of incarcerated prisoners; (2) the increase (or decrease) in the number of prisoners from previous years; (3) have "a system in which many observers believe that almost all of the power resides in the hands of the executive and its agent, the prosecutor" and that the Apprendi doctrine's focus on jury sentencing actually has the effect of handing more power to prosecutors).
107. Over a decade ago, Professor Robert Misner offered a bolder proposal in which a state agency would determine the amount of state prison capacity, that prison space would be allocated to counties on an ex ante basis, and prosecutors would not be permitted to use more space than allocated. Misner, supra note 9, at 720-21. If a county used less than its allocated resources, it would reap a windfall to spend on education or other matters. /d. By contrast, if a county used more resources than allocated, then it would be required to use its own money to purchase additional prison space from the state or another jurisdiction. See id. Unfortunately, no legislature has adopted Professor Misner's proposal for dealing with the diffusion of responsibility between county prosecutors' charging and plea bargaining decisions on the one hand and state funding of incarceration on the other. Unlike Professor Misner's approach, mine would not require any systematic changes to the criminal justice system and therefore may have a better chance of occurring.
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As of
As you know, prosecutors can have a significant impact in reducing prison overcrowding because judges give great weight to prosecutors' sentencing recommendations.
The proposal will not drastically change how prosecutors charge, dismiss, or plea bargain cases.
110 Presented with a murder case, prosecutors will not decline to charge suspects simply because they are well versed in the overcrowding of their state's prisons. Faced with an aggravated assault, prosecutors will not seek probation instead of prison time. Incarceration will still be the first weapon of choice for prosecutors, and they will likely dispense it in roughly the same number of cases and in roughly the same amounts as they would have in the absence of incarceration information 109. These numbers are offered as a general example, but they do bear relation to the general incarceration story in the United States. In 2000, the last year for which the Bureau of Justice Statistics conducted a census on the issue, 324 of the 1320 state prisons in the United States were under a court order or consent decree. See STEPHEN & KARBERG, supra note 38, at iv, 9. Averaged among the 50 states, this amounts to 26.4 prisons per state with 6.5 prisons under court orders or consent decrees.
110. See Misner, supra note 9, at 763 ("The American criminal justice system does not respond well to suggestions for fundamental change.").
from the Bureau of Prisons. Yet, while additional information will not foster drastic behavioral changes, it is quite possible that it could change behavior at the margins, particularly with respect to nonviolent criminals who make up roughly half of the nation's prisoners.
111
For example, imagine that a hypothetical prosecutor is willing to offer a plea bargain carrying a nineteen-month sentence for a run-of-the-mill nonviolent criminal charged with drug possession.
112 Now imagine the prosecutor is advised of prison overcrowding before making the deal. Obviously, the prosecutor will still charge the defendant and will still want to ensure that he serves a serious prison term. However, instead of offering a bottom-line deal of nineteen months, perhaps the prosecutor will offer seventeen months because, in the back of her mind, she is thinking about prison overcrowding.
This two month decrease, alone, will not even be noticeable in a country that has more than two-million people behind bars. But changes at the margins can have a big effect when multiplied by thousands of criminal defendants each year. If the two month effect occurs in thousands of cases throughout the country it will result in a noticeable (though still not dramatic) decrease in incarceration over time.
113
To visualize the idea, think of mass imprisonment as a bubble that is about to burst. The goal is not to drain all or even half the air out of the balloon but, instead, to leak a little air out of the balloon so that it is no longer on the verge of bursting. Importantly, the proposal does not require prosecutors to do anything. Instead, it provides prosecutors with a picture of the overinflated balloon and signals to them that they can leak some of the air out if they want to depressurize the situation.
B. Supporting Evidence from Social Psychology Literature
Although it is impossible to say for certain whether an informational campaign would have any effect on prosecutors' charging decisions, there is a body of social psychology literature that gives cause for optimism. 113. Of course, as Professor Kevin Reitz has recently demonstrated, raw incarceration numbers will rise before they diminish, even assuming that there is zero incarceration growth in future years. See Reitz, supra note 18, at 1788-89. The reason is attributable to the lengthy sentences that have been handed down in recent years. !d. As Professor Reitz explains, we must think not just in terms of the number of people incarcerated, but also based on the number of "person-years" of confmement that are handed down. !d. In the long-run however, my proposal will reduce "person-years."
As countless media studies have demonstrated, people are susceptible to suggestion on a huge variety of issues, not the least of which is crime and criminal justice policy."
4 Social psychologists have long posited that increases in knowledge and persuasive efforts can affect attitudes and behavior. 115 This should not be surprising, considering that corporations spend billions of dollars on advertising and that the government makes frequent use of public service announcements.
To evaluate whether prosecutors can be influenced by an informational campaign, one can consider social psychologists' studies which have found that public health messages can influence behavior.
116 For example, researchers who provided beach-goers with a brochure detailing the benefits of wearing sunscreen found that those individuals were more likely to request a free bottle of sunscreen.
117 In another experiment, researchers found that women who received a message encouraging them to take responsibility for detecting breast cancer were more likely to obtain a mammogram during the following year. received letters from physicians describing the number of years of life that would be cut short if they did not quit, the subjects reduced smoking.
119
An attempt to influence prosecutorial decision making would be akin to a public health campaign to reduce skin cancer, breast cancer, or smoking.
12° For decades, public service announcements have had some success at shaping behavior.
121 And social psychology teaches us that there are a host of effective tactics that can be employed in a campaign to influence prosecutors.
First, social psychologists have demonstrated that information conveyed in written texts can have persuasive impact.
122 Unlike visual or verbal messages, which go by quickly and sometimes force the audience to focus on peripheral cues such as the credibility of the person conveying the message, written texts offer readers the opportunity to review the message carefully at their own pace.
123 Thus, more complicated messages are (explaining how a media campaign about cardiovascular disease led to positive behavioral changes, including decreased smoking).
120. As with teen smoking public service announcements, it might also be useful to aim the message at younger "junior" 1998) (explaining that the degree of difference between the advocated behavior and the individual's actual behavior affects motivation to comply with the message being advocated). Thus, for an informational campaign aimed at prosecutors to have maximum effect, it should reach junior prosecutors as early as possible, before their attitudes toward incarceration are too fmnly set. 
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sometimes easier to convey in writing. 124 Indeed, industries that have been foreclosed from television and radio advertising-notably tobacco manufacturers-have continued to enjoy success through print advertising. 125 The fact that the Bureau of Prisons would reach prosecutors through a written memorandum should not preclude the information from being effective.
Second, the manner in which the written text is conveyed is important. Information is more likely to be effective if it is tailored in a personal fashion. 126 The note that the sample memorandum in Part liLA is therefore addressed by name to "John Q. effective when they are framed as a creating a "gain." 130 In particular, "gainframed" messages are most effective when the suggested action appears to involve little or no risk.
131 Because offering a marginally lower prison sentence would be a low risk behavior for most prosecutors, a "gainframed" message would likely be most successful in encouraging that behavior. 132 Fourth, the reference to statistics about the number of persons incarcerated, the increase in incarceration over the last year, and the percent of operating capacity, is also likely to be influential. 133 Although scholars debate the persuasive influence of statistics, some studies have found them to be more persuasive than narrative evidence. more likely to be persuaded through repetition, 138 but that persuasion wears out at a certain point. 139 Although there is no defmitive correct answer, I propose that the bureaucracy strike the balance between repetition and saturation by sending the imprisonment information once per month as well as whenever a prison milestone occurs. Milestones would include ( 1) a new prison being subjected to a court order or consent decree; (2) prisons exceeding 100% capacity for the first time; or (3) whenever a 1000 increment of prisoners is reached for the first time-for example, when occupancy increases from 26,999 inmates to 27,000 prisoners.
C.
Potential Objections and Responses
There are a number of objections and problems that could stand in the way of using incarceration information to push for a marginal decrease in imprisonment. In particular, prosecutors might offer inconsistent sentences to similarly situated defendants due to the timing of when they receive notice of the incarceration information. Similarly, there might be an inconsistency if some prosecutors remain unpersuaded by the imprisonment information, while other prosecutors in the same jurisdiction are persuaded to seek lower (or possibly even higher) sentences as a result of the information. While there is some merit to these objections, I do not believe they defeat the proposal. 
Inconsistencies Among Prosecutors
At the outset, critics might suggest that even if an informational campaign could influence prosecutors, it would do so inconsistently. Some prosecutors might be willing to offer better plea bargains after reading the imprisonment information, while other prosecutors would be unaffected by the information. While there is almost certainly some truth to this charge, it proves too much. There is already significant variation in the plea bargains that prosecutors offer to similarly situated defendants. 140 While most prosecutors' offices have a "going rate" for common crimes-for example, an unwritten policy that most second-time DWI offenders receive a thirtyday jail sentence-the reality of charge and sentence bargaining already permits wide variations. 141 One prosecutor can offer a thirty-day sentence, while the prosecutor in the court next door can offer fifteen days. The more lenient prosecutor might be willing to plead the defendant down to a reckless driving charge carrying a probated sentence, whereas the tougher prosecutor might demand a guilty plea to the original DWI charge. The possible reasons underlying these variations are endless. Apart from the facts of the cases at hand, one prosecutor might have been influenced by a recent newspaper article about a drunk driver who killed a family; 142 one assistant district attorney might have been raised by a stricter family than the other; or one prosecutor might believe that she can strengthen her reputation and promotion prospects by demanding tougher plea bargains.
143
The key point is that information asymmetries and life experience already work variations in the charge and sentencing bargains offered by different prosecutors. So long as rigid guidelines are not imposed on prosecutors, 144 those variations will always exist. To be sure, providing 143. Consider also the possibility of"holiday," "weekend," or "vacation" specials, whereby prosecutors might offer marginally better plea deals to clear the dockets during times when judges, court staff, and lawyers would prefer not to be bogged down with trials. prosecutors with imprisonment statistics will certainly affect some prosecutors more than others. However, unlike many variables which touch only certain actors, an informational campaign focused on mass imprisonment at least starts from a position where all prosecutors are privy to the same information.
The Problem of Dissipating Benefits
Critics might also argue that even if a critical mass of prosecutors could be influenced by an informational campaign, any benefit from the imprisonment information would dissipate over time as prosecutors forget about the information or as they become over-saturated and ignore it. Once again, there is some obvious truth to this criticism. It is logical to expect that prosecutors might be more willing to offer better plea bargains in the . hours or days after receiving the overcrowding information than many weeks thereafter. 145 Similarly, as memoranda about prison statistics arrive month after month, it seems likely that prosecutors will be influenced by them less and less, in the same way that consumers learn to tune out advertisements that appear too often. 146 Nevertheless, while these objections have merit, they should not be overstated.
Even if an informational campaign only leads prosecutors to decrease their charge and sentencing bargains for a few months, it may nevertheless create significant long-term benefits by reducing the baseline sentence for some crimes. For example, imagine that the unwritten "going rate" in a local prosecutor's office for a drug possession charge is twenty-four months. Under that going rate, prosecutors sometimes give sentences as low as twenty months or as high as twenty-eight months, but most plea deals are for twenty-four-month sentences. Now assume that the overcrowding information leads a number of prosecutors to reduce their sentencing recommendations for drug possession charges. Instead of occasionally giving a twenty-month sentence, prosecutors over a period of time begin to regularly (though certainly not always) give twenty-month plea deals. Without intending to do so, those prosecutors may reset the baseline by held by prosecutors under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, but explaining that full-scale reform is unlikely).
145. See Cacioppo & Petty, supra note 139; but see Banks et al., supra note 118, at 178 (finding that a loss-framed message about breast cancer influenced women to obtain a mammogram up to a year after receiving the message).
146. See generally Caioppo & Petty, supra note 139.
making twenty months the going rate for drug possession charges. 147 Thus, even if prosecutors decline to keep lowering sentences for drug possession (and other crimes) below twenty months as further incarceration information is provided by the Bureau of Prisons, the prosecutors will already have taken steps that will reduce mass imprisonment well into the future.
Of course, for the informational campaign to have maximum effect, it would be preferable if prosecutors did not quickly begin to ignore the imprisonment information after receiving it. Recognizing that there is a saturation point at which the persuasiveness of information declines, there are steps that can be taken to keep the information at its maximum potency. First, rather than sending the imprisonment information on the same day of every month, the Bureau of Prisons might "mix it up" to ensure that the information updates arrive somewhat irregularly. 148 Second, in addition to sending a monthly information update, the Bureau of Prisons might also send extra documentation, packaged in a different color envelope, whenever milestones are struck. For instance, each time an additional 1000 people are incarcerated or every time prison population increases by one percent, the Bureau of Prisons might send prosecutors an additional informational letter. And by packaging the letter in a different colored envelope-for instance, the Bureau of Prisons could send a red envelope each time the prison population reaches another 1000 person milestone-prosecutors wpuld be aware of the milestone even if they failed to open or read the letter (so long as they knew the significance of the red envelopes).
Will Prosecutors Ignore the Information?
A third objection to an informational campaign is that the vast majority of prosecutors would be unaffected by an informational campaign because they already know of prison overcrowding or because, even if informed, it simply would not affect their plea bargaining decisions.
While prosecutors are generally aware of prison overcrowding, at present they do not pay much attention to the problem on a daily basis. As Professors Zirnring and Hawkins explained in their landmark book on American incarceration, "[t]o judges and prosecutors imprisonment may seem to be available as a free good or service"-the equivalent of a 147. See Brown, supra note 104, at 370 (arguing for cost-benefit analysis in criminal law and suggesting that it could "gradually contribute to a change in prosecutorial culture").
148. See supra note 137 and accompanying text (noting the benefit of surprising messages).
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"correctional free lunch." 149 Prosecutors simply do not give much thought to prison capacity when they are standing face to face with criminal defendants.
The more vexing question is what prosecutors would do if they were regularly forced to contemplate the realities of mass imprisonment. Some local prosecutors might well disclaim any responsibility to decrease their sentencing recommendations. They might contend that the State enacts the criminal laws and that the State alone bears responsibility for finding enough prison beds to house all those who have violated the laws. Local prosecutors might contend that their job requires them to enforce the exact letter of the criminal laws, regardless of prison overcrowding. While this contention sounds lofty, it ultimately rings hollow.
150
The very existence of plea bargaining suggests that prosecutors could not enforce the exact letter of the criminal law in all cases through trials and maximum sentences. 151 Even the most junior prosecutor recognizes that without charge and sentencing bargaining, their courts, as currently run, would grind to a halt. 152 As Judge Gerald Lynch has explained, because of the limited resources of the criminal justice system, "prosecutorial decisions inevitably combine judgments of desert with judgments of resources allocation."
153 Indeed, in many instances, prosecutors are eager to engage in charge or sentencing bargaining to avoid the harsh results of mandatory minimum statutes or instances where the statutory punishments for the charged crime are not a good fit for the actual conduct at hand. 154 Additionally, local prosecutors could say that prison overcrowding is "not my problem," or that "it should be the prosecutor from the neighboring county, not me, who should scale back her sentences." That tragedy of the commons 155 problem is a serious concern, yet it is offset by the pervasive view of prosecutors that it is their obligation to serve a higher calling to "do justice" or act for the public interest. 156 As such, while collective action and tragedy of the commons concerns stand in the way, it is likely that prosecutors will be influenced by an informational campaign. The question often raised in opposition to reform proposals is: Why would the legislature act? In other words, why would legislators-who take contributions from corrections unions and benefit politically from being tough on crime-seek to reduce incarceration by requiring that prosecutors be advised of imprisonment data? The answer is twofold: First, legislators are willing to make criminal justice reforms when the reforms are politically neutral and do not raise red flags. Second, in times of tight budgets, legislatures have much to gain by reducing corrections costs.
A. Non-Controversial Criminal Justice Reforms Are Regularly Enacted
At the outset, I must acknowledge the obvious fact that legislators are loath to appear soft on crime. Accordingly, reform proposals requiring legislatures to make sweeping changes favorable to criminal defendants are highly unlikely to be enacted. 158 Thus, if my proposal runs the risk of exposing legislators to being labeled soft on crime, I would concede that it is highly unlikely to be put into place.
The question, therefore, is how controversial it would be to require that the Bureau of Prisons inform prosecutors about imprisonment levels and confinement conditions. I would posit that the proposal would not be controversial at all. Legislators would in no way be taking unpopular positions such as decriminalizing behavior or reducing statutory sentencing ranges. 159 To the contrary, legislators would be instituting a seemingly neutral policy that prosecutors regularly receive accurate factual information about prison capacity. To put it in real world language, campaign could lead prosecutors to offer higher sentences on the belief that prison overcrowding will lead to early release of criminals. It is, of course, impossible to rule out an unanticipated backlash effect, but in this context it seems unlikely to occur. In most jurisdictions, prosecutors are well aware of the rules governing the early release of prisoners because such rules are integral to plea bargaining negotiations. In states with determinate sentencing laws, prosecutors know that statutes prevent the release of prisoners before they have served a particular percentage of their sentences. And in states with indeterminate sentencing schemes, prosecutors are already aware, and in fact rely on, the typical ratio of credit that prisoners receive for days served.
158 legislators would simply be requiring that one set of government workers (bureaucrats in the Bureau of Prisons) shuffle some paperwork to another set of government workers (the county prosecutors). 160 It is difficult to see how the increased paper flow could be painted as soft on crime.
Indeed, the criminal justice system regularly requires that additional paperwork be exchanged between government departments or agencies. For example, when the FBI begins a preliminary inquiry in a "sensitive criminal matter[ s ]" such as an investigation of political corruption or malfeasance related to a religious organization or the news media, it is obligated to notify the relevant United States Attorney as soon as practicable.
161 If the FBI terminates the investigation, it must notify the appropriate federal prosecutor within thirty days. 162 And if the FBI refers a serious matter to state or local prosecutors and they decline to prosecute, the FBI is obligated to advise the relevant federal prosecutor in writing within thirty days.
163
Perhaps more relevant, legislatures are willing to implement "neutral" criminal justice reforms that generate little opposition from prosecutors and other powerful interest groups. 164 For example, legislatures occasionally vest sentencing commissions with the power to develop prosecutorial standards for charging and plea bargaining decisions. 165 When the commissions then engage in non-controversial (but still useful) projects, such as codifying preexisting prosecutorial standards, they meet little resistance. 166 Consider also that a number of states and localities have bucked the national trend and established salary parity between prosecutors ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL [Ariz. St. L.J.
and government funded defense lawyers. 167 As Professor Ron Wright explains, funding parity was put into place in these jurisdictions because the legal community-including the American Bar Association, judges, administrators, defense lawyers and many prosecutors-favor equal salaries. 168 Essentially, the idea is not controversial enough for interest groups and tough on crime advocates to become exercised. Additionally, as Professor Bill Stuntz has detailed, although states practically never narrow criminal liability, legislatures have offered criminal procedure protections beyond those mandated by the United States Supreme Court. 169 These include recent bans on racial profiling and legislation encouraging DNAbased innocence claims. 170 In sum, legislators are not averse to criminal justice reforms that will not carry the soft on crime label.
B. Budget Constraints Provide a Strong Incentive For Legislative Action
If I am correct that ordering prosecutors to be better informed about prison capacity would not be controversial or even noticeable to the public at large, the next question is why legislators would bother to spend their time implementing such a bland proposal that will not gamer headlines. The answer is money.
While certain legislators are only interested in proposing legislation that will bring them notoriety, many legislators are motivated by more pedestrian concerns such as reducing governmental spending. For instance, consider legislators who sit on appropriations committees. By virtue of having to wallow in intricate details in search of a balanced budget, appropriations committee members may be interested in enacting administrative reforms that could reduce expenditures. And given the power that comes with sitting on appropriations committees, if a member proposed a bill to provide more information to prosecutors, it is unlikely that other legislators would put up much, if any, opposition. 171 When we consider that corrections expenditures cost billions of dollars per year, 172 it is entirely possible that cost conscious legislators would embrace the opportunity to lower costs at the margins by indirectly influencing prosecutorial behavior. Indeed, as Professor Rachel Barkow has catalogued, there are an abundance of recent examples where legislators relied on fiscal concerns to make far more controversial changes to sentencing policy:
A Michigan legislator noted that when he first introduced bills to reduce mandatory minimum sentences, he received little support. After a conference on the state budget, however, the governor called him "to see how we can make these bills happen." Kansas's decision to require treatment instead of incarceration for first-time, nonviolent drug offenders rested in part on the fact that "those people who favor being tough on crime don't want to find the money to build more prisons." Washington passed its drug treatment diversion programs, according to one expert, because "(t]he fiscal crisis has brought together the folks who think sentences are too long with the folks who are perfectly happy with the sentences but think prison is costing too much." One Texas state representative supported treatment options for drug offenders because it was cost effective and would free prison space for more violent offenders. Several governors have ordered the early release of prisoners with the explicit goal of reducing correctional costs and addressing budget crises. 173 In recent years, numerous states have sought to reduce their corrections expenditures to save money. 174 A report by the Vera Institute of Justice more noteworthy, a Texas legislator opposed a request to spend $267 million to build new facilities to deal with chronic overcrowding in the Harris County jails, taking the seemingly unpopular position that more defendants should simply be released on bail. 184 Governors across the country have even closed existing prisons in order to save money. 185 Recent opposition to prison funding is not surprising in times of tight budgets because many states 186 require a balanced budget. 187 As prison costs have skyrocketed, some legislators understandably have begun expressing concerns about having enough funding for other public services such as healthcare, education, and law enforcement.
188 A decade ago it may have been impossible to consider cutting corrections budgets, for fear of being perceived as weak on crime, today it is frequently contemplated.
189
In her recent (and excellent) book, Professor Marie Gottschalk expressed skepticism that the high costs of incarceration will lead legislators to take steps to decrease mass imprisonment. 190 Gottschalk explains that while legislators might have the desire to cut costs at the margins, the prison- industrial complex is too entrenched to permit dramatic change. 191 As she puts it, "the construction of the carceral state was the result of a complex set of historical, institutional, and political developments. No single factor explains its rise, and no single factor will bring about its demise."
192 If Gottschalk is correct, and I believe she is, then legislative or bureaucratic action is unlikely to cause drastic change. Yet, the proposal I offer is not intended to trigger dramatic change, a prospect I view as unrealistic.
193
Rather, my proposal explores the possibility of reducing mass imprisonment at the margins as a way to reset the baseline over a lengthy period of time. Given recent legislative trends to trim corrections budgets, such a modest proposal may be plausible.
V.
CONCLUSION
The problem of mass imprisonment in the United States took decades to create and it will not be cured overnight. Nevertheless, there are steps that can be taken to encourage the system's most powerful actorsprosecutors-to exercise their authority in a manner likely to decrease incarceration. Social psychology research suggests that if prosecutors were better advised of escalating imprisonment numbers and the overcrowding of prisons and jails, they would likely offer marginally lower plea bargains. The marginally lower plea bargains would thereby reduce incarceration at the margins. Over time, these marginal decreases in incarceration would have a noteworthy impact on the mass imprisonment problem. Legislatures have an incentive to institute an informational campaign because it carries a low risk of being labeled soft on crime while holding out a potential benefit of significant savings on correctional costs. 193. Gottschalk, for instance, sets as her goal reducing the incarceration rate to about 110 prisoners per 100,000 people, which amounts to a decrease of75% of the prison population. See id. at 238. By contrast, I would be pleased to see a decrease of 5%. See also WESTERN, supra note 24, at 198 ("The self-sustaining character of mass imprisonment as an engine of social inequality makes it likely that the penal system will remain as it has become, a significant feature on the new landscape of American poverty and race relations.").
